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Can Ipso Facto Clauses Resolve the Discharge Debate?:
An Economic Approach to Novated Fraud
Debt in Bankruptcy
Michael J. Di Gennaro*
and Harley J. Goldstein**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court is on the verge of resolving an
issue that has divided lower courts for more than fifty years:' whether
fraud-related claims, ordinarily excepted from discharge under section
* Candidate for J.D., New York University School of Law, 2004; M.A., Columbia University,
1997; B.S., Cornell University, 1994. This Article is based on a work presented by Mr. Di Gen-
naro as his thesis for the New York University School of Law's Galgay Fellowship in Bankruptcy
and Reorganization Law. Mr. Di Gennaro would like to thank Professor Barry E. Adler for his
patience and constructive guidance throughout the development of this Article, as well as Judge
Cornelius Blackshear and Professors Sanford Ikeda, Dean R. Lillard, and Alan Mathios.
** Senior Associate, Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, 1997; B.A., Arizona State University, 1994. Mr. Goldstein is a member of the Bar of both
Illinois and New York. Mr. Goldstein would like to thank David L. Kane, an associate at his
firm, for his invaluable research assistance.
1. As this Article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court decided Archer v.
Warner (In re Archer), No. 01-1418, slip op. 1 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003), reversing the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Archer v. Warner (In re Archer), 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir.
2002). Although the Supreme Court held that despite any novation of the fraud-based debt in
that case, such debt could nevertheless be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy, the Court
explicitly declined to decide whether the parties to the novation meant "to resolve th[e] issue [of
fraud] for purposes of a later claim of nondischargeability in bankruptcy [,]" finding that the
Court of Appeals did not address (and permitting the Court of Appeals, on remand, to consider)
this argument. Archer v. Warner (In re Archer), No. 01-1418, slip op. at 7-8 (U.S. Mar. 31,
2003). The Supreme Court's opinion therefore buttresses this Article's conclusion that parties to
a novation should explicitly provide for the consequences of bankruptcy in settlements of tort-
based claims. See supra Part V. Indeed, the approach recommended in this Article resolves the
debate between Archer's majority and dissenting opinions. In his dissent, Justice Thomas
(joined by Justice Stevens) believed that the intent of the parties was to release the fraud-based
claim in any subsequent proceeding, as evidenced by the "sweeping language" of the release
contained in the novation. Archer v. Warner (In re Archer), No. 01-1418, slip op. 1 (U.S. Mar.
31, 2003) (Thomas, J. and Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Stevens)
also recognized that the parties could contract for whichever result they sought fit. See id. at 5
n.2. ("Indeed, petitioners have failed to point to any provision of the Bankruptcy Code that
specifically bars a creditor from entering into an agreement that impairs its right to contest dis-
chargeability."). If the parties succinctly memorialized their intent regarding the effect of a sub-
sequent bankruptcy on the debt, the Court would not have been forced to attempt to infer the
parties' implicit motive from the language of the settlement agreement.
418 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code,2 are dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy where such claims have been transformed into contract debt
prior to the tortfeasor's bankruptcy filing.3
Where a tort claim is converted into an agreement to pay monetary
damages (in exchange for a release of the tort claim), a "novation"
occurs. 4 Although the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception, to the
debt discharge an individual may obtain in bankruptcy, for "any debt
for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representa-
tion, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or
an insider's financial condition," 5 no explicit provision for the dis-
chargeability of novated fraud debt is included. Under Seventh,
Ninth, and, more recently, Fourth Circuit precedent, as a result of its
novation, non-dischargeable fraud debt may metamorphose into dis-
chargeable contract debt upon settlement.6 However, the Courts of
Appeal for the District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits (as well as
a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the Sixth Circuit)7 disagree, and hold
that courts should examine the underlying cause (in contrast to the
present form) of the creditor's claim. Accordingly, in certain circuits,
fraud claims remain non-dischargeable regardless of their ultimate
form.8
Although there has been copious debate regarding the respective
rationales for each of these approaches, this Article analyzes the issue
2. Title II of the United States Code is hereinafter referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code."
3. Bankruptcy: Settlement of Fraud Claims Creates Contract Debt Dischargeable in Bank-
ruptcy, U.S. L. WK. DAILY Eon-ION (BNA), at 1547 (Mar. 20, 2002).
4. Novation is sometimes interpreted to mean the act of substituting for an old obligation a
new one that replaces an original party with a new party. See BLACK'S LAW DICF-IONARY 1091
(7th ed. 1999). A good example of this exists in the payments system context, where X's check
to Y: 1) transforms X's bank's liability to X into 2) X's bank's debt to Y's bank, which in turn is
changed into 3) Y's bank's debt to Y. Thus, the check allows X's liability to Y to become Y's
bank's debt to Y. See Joseph H. Sommer, Where is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REv. 1, 10
(1998). However, like the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the term in the context of section
523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code is hereinafter used to express the substitution of a contract
claim for a tort claim through a settlement agreement. See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236 n.8.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2002).
6. See In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1994); Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer (In re
Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 237.
7. In certain circuits and under certain circumstances, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels hear ap-
peals from bankruptcy court decisions, and are comprised of specially-appointed bankruptcy
judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2002). In essence, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels hear these
appeals in lieu of being heard by United States District Courts, and their decisions are review-
able by the appropriate Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c), (d).
8. See Greenberg v. Schools, 7tI F.2d 152, 156 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v.
Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (in re Francis), 226
B.R. 385, 391 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (electing to follow Spicer).
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from an economic perspective, and offers a recommendation based on
the analysis. This analysis yields the conclusion that where the risk of
bankruptcy cannot be priced into a novation, or where a creditor can
assess the risk of a debtor's insolvency (but chooses not to accept it),
the implementation of an ipso facto clause - a "contract clause that
specifies the consequences of a party's bankruptcy"9 - may resolve
this dilemma by shielding a plaintiff-creditor's1 ° novation from a de-
fendant-debtor's 1 bankruptcy risk, while at the same time allowing
the parties to derive the benefits of the novation.
Part 1I of this Article clarifies the doctrines of the divided circuit
courts. Part II.A identifies the case history and reasoning of the
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that support the "novation the-
ory," while Part II.B presents the case history and reasoning of the
Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits (and the Sixth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel) that reject this theory.
Part III of this Article briefly comments on the technicalities of the
debate. Part III.A discusses the logic underlying the promotion of set-
tlement, while Part III.B questions whether the goals of each ap-
proach are being fulfilled.
Part IV of this Article proposes the ipso facto clause as a potential
solution to the problems inherent in both approaches. Part IV.A de-
scribes how an ipso facto clause would operate in terms of the dis-
chargeability provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. It provides an
analysis of how an ipso facto clause furthers the objectives of courts
on both sides of the debate. Part III.B gives attention to the obstacles
inherent in implementing such an approach. These obstacles include
the fact that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly forbids ipso facto clauses
in certain instances, and where not outright forbidden, certain bank-
ruptcy courts frown upon the clauses for equitable reasons. In addi-
tion, Part IV of the Article examines the enforceability of ipso facto
clauses in various other scenarios.
However, the general arguments against ipso facto clauses are
weak, and in the novation context, especially debile.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 834 (7th ed. 1999). Literally, "ipso facto" means "by the fact
itself." Id. at 833.
10. This term is used throughout this Article to signify the potential plaintiff to a fraud claim
who subsequently novates it.
11. This term is used throughout this Article to signify the potential defendant of a fraud
claim who subsequently becomes the debtor-party to a novation.
2003]
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II. THE DEBATE
The debate has emerged from two distinct lines of cases. The Sev-
enth Circuit first approached the problem of the dischargeability of a
novated fraud claim in the late 1940s, decidedly favoring the dis-
charge, and establishing what is more commonly referred to as the
Maryland Casualty approach to dischargeability. 12 The Ninth Circuit
was next to weigh in when, in its 1967 decision in Gonder v. Kelley, it
adopted the Maryland Casualty approach. 13
However, when faced with the same issue in the early 1980s, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Greenberg v. Schools, adopted the dissenting view
of Gonder v. Kelly, rejecting the Maryland Casualty approach and
holding that "a debt which originates from the debtor's fraud should
not be discharged simply because the debtor entered into a settlement
agreement."' 4 Subsequently, that approach gained the support of the
District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits.' 5 Since "[m]any bankruptcy
courts have followed the Greenberg approach," it was considered at
that time to be the majority approach.' 6 However, despite the fact
that many of those cases have been deemed consistent with the Mary-
land Casualty approach by those circuit courts favoring it,' 7 numerous
bankruptcy courts adopting the approach have not been explicitly in
its accord.' 8
Regardless of the situation at the time, the recently decided case of
Archer v. Warner squarely placed the Fourth Circuit in the Maryland
Casualty camp, pitting the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits against
courts in the Sixth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia circuits.' 9
With Maryland Casualty and its progeny on one side, and Greenberg
12. Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1948).
13. Gonder v. Kelly, 372 F.2d 94, 94 (9th Cir. 1967)(affirmed for the reasons stated in the
district court's opinion); In re Kelley, 259 F. Supp. 297, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
14. Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 156 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming on the basis of the
district court opinion, 21 B.R. 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1982), for the reasons articulated by the dissent in
Gonder v. Kelley, 372 F.2d at 94-95 (Koelsch, J., dissenting)).
15. See supra note 7.
16. David Zelikoff, Fraud By Any Other Name Is Still Fraud: Settling a Potential Fraud Claim
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 866, 869 (1996).
17. See infra note 28.
18. See, e.g., In re Kovacs, 42 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). See also In re Carnahan, 115
B.R. 697 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (holding that the component of a debtor's settlement agreement
attributable to fraudulent conduct cannot be discharged); 43 E. 74th St. Assocs. v. Marceca (In re
Marceca), 129 B.R. 371 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that despite debtor having signed a
note to pay back money allegedly misappropriated, the nondischargeable alleged debt did not
become a dischargeable contract claim). But see, e.g., Blackhawk B.M.X., Inc. v. Anderson (In
re Anderson), 64 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1986).
19. See supra note 7.
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v. Schools and its descendants on the other, the battle lines in the
discharge debate are clearly demarcated.
A. The Maryland Casualty Approach
In Maryland Casualty, a defendant embezzled funds from a bank
that agreed to waive a tort action in exchange for execution of a prom-
issory note.20 Subsequently, the defendant filed for protection under
the Bankruptcy Code, and the plaintiff sued upon the note.2' The
court described the rule that it would use to determine whether the
plaintiff was entitled to prevent the discharge of the debt:
The general rule is that a promissory note is but the evidence of
indebtedness and does not discharge the debt for which it was given.
And, of course, where a note is accepted only as evidence of a pre-
existing debt and not as satisfaction or waiver of a tort action, ac-
ceptance of such a note will not of itself waive the original cause of
action. But if it is shown that the note, by express agreement, is
given and received, as payment or waiver of the antecedent tort ac-
tion, and if the agreement is that the note operates to discharge the
original obligation and substitute a new one therefor - in other
words, that it is taken in payment of the debt - then the original
debt is fully satisfied by acceptance of the note.
22
The court ultimately agreed with the district court's determination
that due to an express agreement, "the tort liability had been satisfied
and discharged by the execution of the note and that the indebtedness
upon the note, in turn, was barred by the discharge in bankruptcy.
'23
More recently, the Seventh Circuit rearticulated the holding of Ma-
ryland Casualty in In re West, describing it as a two-part approach.
2 4
The first part of the holding is that a promissory note generally does
not discharge the debt for which it is given.25 The second part is that
if, however:
[I]t is shown that the note was given and received as payment or
waiver of the original debt and the parties agreed that the note was
to substitute a new obligation for the old, the note fully discharges
the original debt, and the nondischargeability of the original debt
does not affect the dischargeability of the obligation under the
note. 26
20. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1948).
21. Id. at 258.
22. Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 259.
24. In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Given the two-part dynamic of the approach, the Seventh Circuit con-
tends that there is no tension regarding the dischargeability of
novated fraud-type debt between circuits; that the Maryland Casualty
approach is entirely consistent with the Greenberg v. Schools ap-
proach.27 The West court asserts that, when considering Greenberg v.
Schools, attention must be given to the fact that the bankruptcy court
in Greenberg found that the parties never agreed that the note was to
substitute a new obligation for the old, failing the second prong of
Maryland Casualty, and thus not creating a dischargeable novation.28
Similarly, when confronted with a myriad of cases intended to con-
vince the court of the weight of case law favoring the abandonment of
the Maryland Casualty approach, the court insisted that those "cases,
which held that settlements did not change the nature of the underlying
obligation, are entirely consistent with Maryland Casualty because
none involved a release. '29 However, those opposing the Maryland
Casualty approach claim that the West court misread these cases; de-
spite an express release from liability, the debt was not dischargea-
ble. 30  For example, the Spicer court quoted a bankruptcy court
decision stating that "debt that originates from the debtor's fraud
should not be discharged simply because the debtor has entered into a
settlement. . . agreement, and the debt now arises from a contract
27. Id.
28. In re West, 22 F.3d at 777 (citing In re Schools, 14 B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981),
vacated on other grounds and remanded sub norn. Greenberg v. Schools, 21 B.R. 1011 (D.C. Fla.
1982), affd, 711 F.2d 152 (11th Cir. 1983)). But see United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1156
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (pointing out that while the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Greenberg indeed
offered no details of what was offered in the settlement agreement, the prior history of the case
suggests that "settlement agreement may well have included a release of the underlying fraud
claim").
29. In re West, 22 F.3d at 777 (emphasis added). The court considered the following cases: In
re Bobofchak, 101 B.R. 465 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Pavelka, 79 B.R. 228, 232 n.15 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Castonguay, 77 B.R. 602, 606 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Rush, 33 B.R.
97 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Covino (In re Covino), 12 B.R. 876 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio 1939);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Behr (In re Behr), 42 B.R. 922, 926 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (release
from criminal charges only). But see United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
("On our reading of those cases, however, they cannot be reconciled with Maryland Casualty.").
31. The Spicer court provided In re Bobofchak, 101 B.R. at 467-68, as an example, which
"expressly rejected the theory that novation extinguishes nondischargeability, saying that con-
trary to the debtor's contention that the settlement extinguished the underlying tort claim
against him," and that regardless of the structure of the settlement it was the bankruptcy court's
responsibility to look at the character of the debtor's original claim. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156.
Similarly, the Spicer court thought In re Pavelka, 79 B.R. at 232, illustrative, showing that while
the settlement agreement in that case purported to release the debtor from liability, the court
would look at the underlying nature of the debt for a determination of dischargeability. See
Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156-57.
[Vol. 1:417
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rather than a tort."'31 There are numerous examples of this "parry and
jab" dialogue between the supporters and opponents of the Maryland
Casualty approach, whose dissection would not be instructive at this
point.32
The encouragement and enforcement of settlements is the primary
reason that courts give for adopting or obeying the Maryland Casualty
approach. 33 These courts assert that this is achieved through their re-
spect for the contractual freedom of the parties by supporting the con-
tract law principle of ensuring parties receive their respective "benefit
of the bargain. '34 The Fourth Circuit cogently spelled these principles
out in a recent decision:
The [Maryland Casualty approach] favors the basic principle of en-
couraging settlements by way of freedom to enter into settlement
agreements, regardless of the nature of the claim subject to the set-
tlement agreement. Under this theory, parties willing to settle dis-
putes over fraud, misrepresentation, or like tort claims may do so by
way of settlement through contract, and such contractual claims are
then dischargeable in bankruptcy. Otherwise, the incentive to settle
is gone.35
While the circuit courts neglect to expand on their determination
that the Maryland Casualty rule effectively encourages and enforces
settlements, they opine that Congress never intended section 523(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code to be construed in such a way as to discourage
the settlement of claims because they may be non-dischargeable. 36
Nor do they believe that enforcing the contractual obligation, rather
than the underlying tort, produces an inequitable result in the bank-
31. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156-57 (citing In re Peters, 90 B.R. 588, 604 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988))
(emphasis added). But see In re West, 22 F.3d at 778 (distinguishing Peters as considering "the
matters of a subrogor's rights with respect to non-dischargeable debts, and not the continuing
vitality of a creditor's release of a nondischargeable debt").
32. See, e.g., In re West, 22 F.3d at 778 (confronted with In re Schmidt, 70 B.R. 634 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1986), the West court distinguished it as a case where debtor allegedly engaged in fraud
in obtaining the release of liability, a consideration absent in Maryland Casualty).
33. See Md. Cas. Co., 171 F.2d at 259 (stating: "Hence, if the agreement between the parties
... was that plaintiff accepted the note in substitution of the tort action, a contract thus made
would be binding. This is so because compromise, accord and satisfaction are open to one claim-
ing to have a tort action.") (emphasis added). See also In re West, 22 F.3d at 778 ("The Maryland
Casualty approach encourages and enforces settlements. A tort-feasor may well be inclined to
pay an aggrieved party a larger sum in settlement if the settlement contains a release from future
claims based on the same conduct.") (emphasis added).
34. See Gonder v. Kelley, 372 F.2d 94, 94 (9th Cir. 1967)(affirmed for the reasons stated in the
district court's opinion, In re Kelley, 259 F Supp. 297, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1965) ("To allow the
respondents to now go behind the note to establish the nondischargeable character of the origi-
nal indebtedness would destroy the very essence of what the bankrupt bargained for in the
agreement .... )).
35. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner). 283 F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir. 2002).
36. Id.
2003]
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ruptcy context since, following the "agreement between parties" re-
quirement of the second prong of Maryland Casualty,37 the creditor -
not the debtor - discharges the obligation. 38
B. The Greenberg v. Schools Approach
Greenberg emerged from a corporate managerial dispute, where the
plaintiff (Greenberg), in a New Jersey action, alleged that the defen-
dant (Schools) engaged in fraud, misappropriation, and misuse of cor-
porate funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity in managing the
corporation. 39 Prior to trial, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement whereby Schools executed a $90,000 promissory note upon
which he made $50,000 payments in principal and interest before de-
faulting. 40 A second New Jersey action on the promissory note re-
sulted in the execution of a new settlement agreement whereby
Schools agreed to pay Greenberg $78,102.66, in monthly installments
of $892.20.41 However, Schools then moved to Florida and filed for
bankruptcy protection. Greenberg was the subsequent appeal from an
adversary proceeding initiated by the plaintiff objecting to any dis-
charge of the debt, and contending that the exceptions to the Bank-
ruptcy Code's discharge provisions covered his claim.42
Examining two district court cases dealing with similar factual cir-
cumstances, 43 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court's de-
termination that the debt was dischargeable. 44 It vacated the final
judgment and remanded the decision to the bankruptcy court, order-
ing it to:
[l]nquire into the factual circumstances behind the settlement
agreement to ascertain whether or not the debt incurred by appellee
Schools was derived from the alleged fraudulent conduct while
managing the... corporation. If the court is satisfied that Schools'
conduct was fraudulent and did result in the debt that Greenberg
claims against him, the debt should not be discharged by the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 45
37. See In re West, 22 F.3d at 778.
38. Id.
39. See Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 153-54 (11th Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 154.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio 1939); see
also Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Covino (In re Covino), 12 B.R. 876 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
But see supra note 28. These cases were deemed consistent with the Maryland Casualty ap-
proach by the West court.
44. See Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156.
45. Id.
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As discussed supra, while courts supporting the Maryland Casualty
approach argue that it is consistent with the Greenberg approach, 46
they acknowledge that at least one bankruptcy court decision sympa-
thetic to, and claiming to have adopted, Greenberg, directly contra-
venes it.
4 7
Despite the Seventh Circuit's professed inability to identify tension
between Maryland Casualty and Greenberg, given the Greenberg ap-
proach's adherent's reasoning, it seems probable that courts adopting
Greenberg would look behind settlement agreements, even if the
agreement contains an express waiver of the antecedent tort action for a
determination of dischargeability. 48 First, they contend that following
the Maryland Casualty approach circumvents the Congressional policy
of Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(2)(A), by providing all debtors
with a "fresh start" (rather than just those debtors who have not de-
frauded third parties).49 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit in Greenberg
was receptive to the admonition that, by looking at the technical na-
ture of a claim (contract versus tort) over the claim's underlying sub-
stance, the Ninth Circuit was ignoring the United States Supreme
Court's instruction that equitable principles are to govern in bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. 50 Those courts adopting the Greenberg approach
agree. 51
Greenberg proponents invoke several United States Supreme Court
decisions that lend credence to their position.52 Judge Traxler, the dis-
senting voice in Archer v. Warner, reviewed Brown v. Felsen,53 Grogan
v. Garner,54 and Cohen v. de la Cruz, 55 and pointed out that, in
Brown, after reviewing the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act,
the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that Congress re-
quired the fullest possible inquiry into the true nature of debts for
46. See supra note 28.
47. See In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that In re Spicer, 155 B.R.
795 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993), affd, 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1995), explicitly rejected the holding of
Maryland Casualty).
48. See supra note 29.
49. See United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156; see also In re Pavelka, 79 B.R. 228, 232
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Rush, 33 B.R. 97, 98 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Bobofchak, 101
B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Wilson, 12 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
50. Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156 (affirming on the basis of the district court opinion, 21 B.R.
1011 (D.C. Fla. 1982), for the reasons articulated by the dissent in Gonder v. Kelley, 372 F.2d 94,
94-95 (9th Cir. 1967) (Koelsch, J., dissenting)). But see, In re West, 22 F.3d at 778.
51. See, e.g., Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1155.
52. See, e.g., Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (Traxler, J.,
dissenting).
53. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
54. 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
55. 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
2003]
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purposes of determining dischargeability. 56 Similarly, a Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in the Sixth Circuit concluded that Brown v. Felsen
required adoption of the Greenberg approach.57
Twelve years after Brown, the United States Supreme Court held, in
Grogan, that a creditor need only prove by a low evidentiary thresh-
old (a preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing
evidence) that its claim was dischargeable, finding it doubtful "that
Congress, in fashioning the standard of proof that governs the applica-
bility of these provisions, would have favored the interest in giving
perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting vic-
tims of fraud." 58 Finally, in 1998, in support of its decision in Cohen to
uphold the non-dischargeability of a state-court imposed treble dam-
ages award for defendants' fraudulent conduct, the Court cited "the
historical pedigree of the fraud exception, and the general policy un-
derlying the exceptions to discharge." 59 Circuit Judge Traxler felt that
under this weighty authority, "[i]n deciding cases dealing with the
fraud exceptions to dischargeability, courts should effectuate congres-
sional policy objectives by conducting the fullest possible inquiry into
the nature of the debt and limiting relief to the honest but unfortunate
debtor.'"60
III. A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE APPROACHES
An analysis of the discharge debate yields the conclusion that those
courts following the Maryland Casualty approach are concerned about
issues of judicial economy focusing on the likelihood of effectuating
settlement,61 while those opposed to it are more concerned with the
possibility of dishonest debtors' strategic bankruptcy. 62 More opaque
is whether either rule produces its desired objective.
56. See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 239 (Traxler, J., dissenting). But see In re West, 22 F.3d at 778
(dismissing Brown, finding that: "The holding in Brown is immaterial .. .Brown addressed the
preclusive effect of a state court judgment, not a creditor's voluntary release of a debtor.");
accord Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer (in re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1997) ("'res judi-
cata' cases do not control our case, which involves a voluntary agreement between two parties
that created a novation, releasing either side from liability arising from the original contract").
57. Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 391 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)
(choosing to "follow[] Spicer because Brown v. Felsen compels the Spicer result"). See also
Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 266 B.R. 282, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding Brown
"[i]nstructive").
58. See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 239 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (citing Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287).
59. Id. (citing Cohen, 523 U.S. at 223).
60. Id.
61. See supra note 32.
62. See supra note 58.
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A. A Word on Settlements
A settlement is a compromise reflecting the reality that completing
a trial puts the plaintiff's case at risk, subjects the defendant to an
uncertain outcome, and generates litigation costs (such as attorneys'
fees).63 Where transaction costs are low enough, parties will transact
to their mutual benefit by effecting a settlement. 64 In the context of
civil litigation, the benefits of settlement are well recognized 65 - the
benefits are both private and social. 66
1. Private Benefits
There are generally two private benefits to a settlement: the elimi-
nation of transaction costs and the reduction of the risks inherent in a
trial outcome.
a. Elimination of Transaction Costs
Settlements eliminate or reduce transaction costs to the parties in
terms of time and money.67 For example:
[I]f the two parties to a case were to agree, for example, that after
trial the court will definitely award the plaintiff $20,000, but it will
cost each side $4000 to bring the case to trial, then the parties could
save time and money by settling for somewhere between $16,000
(what the plaintiff would net from trial) and $24,000 (what the de-
fendant would spend in damages plus litigation costs). This simple
example illustrates the general principle that where the parties
agree on the likely trial outcome, the aggregate of their litigation
costs (here $8000) creates the settlement "surplus" that constitutes
the parties' settlement range.68
Of course, this economic model is simplistic, as it assumes that the
parties have the same estimate of the likely outcome at trial, are risk-
63. ROBERT W. HAHN, UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT: THE BENEFITS OF SETTLEMENT 1
(American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publica-
tion 02-2, 2002).
64. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 554 (4th ed., Little, Brown
& Co. 1992).
65. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Dis-
putes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON, LITERATURE 1067, 1067-97 (1989).
66. See HAHN, supra note 63, at 3.
67. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PUBLIC EN-
FORCEMENT OF LAW 32 (Harvard Law School: Olin Center, Working Paper No. 235, 1998), avail-
able at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/235.pdf; see BRIAN G. M.
MAIN & ANDREW PARK, PRE-TRIAL SETTLMENT: WHO'S FOR TWO-WAY OFFERS? (Univ. of Edin-
burgh 1999), available at http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/pdf/gaz2.pdf (providing numerical examples
and empirical evidence of transaction costs, bargaining ranges and the likelihood of settlement).
68. Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Ilvolvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 229 (1999).
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neutral, 69 do not engage in strategic behavior in dividing the settle-
ment surplus, have no stakes in the litigation other than the economic
outcome of the particular case, and that settlement costs do not exist
(or at least that litigation costs exceed settlement costs). 70
b. Elimination of Uncertainty in Trial Outcome
The violation of the assumption of risk-neutrality leads to the sec-
ond recognized private advantage of settlements: they eliminate the
risks inherent in a trial outcome - a benefit for any risk-averse 7a
party.72
Risk aversion increases the likelihood of settlement because a risk-
averse party will prefer a sure outcome, such as a $12,000 payment,
even if it is less than the statistically predicted (but uncertain) award
at trial, such as a 70% likelihood of a $20,000 award (accompanied
by a 30% likelihood of no award at all). 73
2. Social Benefits
The social benefits of settlement include the reduction of court costs
and the reduction of congestion of the court system.7 4 One author
69. A risk neutral individual is one who is indifferent among alternatives with the same ex-
pected value. See MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 186 (1991).
70. Lederman, supra note 68, at 229-30.
71. "A person is risk-averse if he prefers a 100 percent chance of a $10 loss to a 10 percent
chance of losing $100." Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Comment, Insurance and Subrogation: When the
Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1356 n.79 (1997). See also
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 (2d ed., Little, Brown
& Co. 1989) (A risk-averse person cares "not only about the expected value" of an accident,
"but also about the absolute magnitude of the risk.").
72. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44-48 (2d ed. 1997). Note also
that, in the corporate context, reduction of uncertainty would necessarily lower the cost of capi-
tal. See, e.g, CARL SHAPIRO, ANTITRUST LIMrrs ro PATENT SETTLEMENTS 7 (Univ. of Cal.,
Working Paper No. 501, 2001).
73. Lederman, supra note 68, at 230 n.60. In this context, an additional example may prove
illustrative. Setting the transactions costs argument mentioned above aside for the moment,
assume the probability of winning (pW) and losing (pL) at trial are equivalent (pW = pL = .05).
Furthermore, assume that accurately calculated damages amount to $D, where D is greater than
zero (D > 0 (also note that another risk of trial is that damages, due to less than perfect informa-
tion, are calculated incorrectly in an amount greater or less than $D). The expected value of
judgment on the tort claim would be 0.5($0) + 0.5($D) = $D / 2. A risk-neutral plaintiff would
be indifferent between going to trial and receiving a promissory note in the amount of $D / 2
(this assumes that there is no risk that the note could later be discharged in bankruptcy). How-
ever, empirically, most individuals are risk averse - not risk neutral. See KATZ & ROSEN, supra
note 69, at 189-90. A risk-averse plaintiff may be as well off with ($D / 2 - x) novated dollars,
where (D / 2) > x > 0 (this again assumes that there is no risk of the defendant's bankruptcy).
Similarly, where y > 0, a risk averse defendant may be indifferent between paying ($D / 2 + y)
novated dollars and proceeding to trial. The dollar amount represented by (y + x) > 0 is "sur-
plus" that creates a bargaining range where both parties can achieve gains.
74. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 72, at 7.
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points out that courts encourage settlement because "parties do not
internalize the costs to the public of continuing to litigate. ' 75 Moreo-
ver, empirical studies suggest that, in the corporate context, the elimi-
nation of an industry member's uncertainty may have positive
economic "spillover" effects on an industry-wide basis.76
3. Undesirable Consequences of Settlement
It merits mentioning that despite both these benefits and society's
mores encouraging freedom to contract, there are socially disadvanta-
geous consequences of settlements. 77 For example, settlements dilute
deterrence since the settlement lowers the injurer's disutility of the
sanctions. 78 Additionally, settlement may result in sanctions that are
not as appropriately designed as adjudicated sanctions for certain
harmful acts.79 That is, in the presence of information asymmetries,80
low-harm victims may be able to obtain settlements in excess of harm,
whereas trial outcomes may more accurately capture the actual
harm.81 This may result in certain injurers taking an excessive (so-
cially sub-optimal) degree of protection since injurers who cause be-
low-average harms may be over-deterred. 82 Third, settlements
squelch the adaptively efficient qualities of common law systems, hin-
dering the broadening and deepening of the law through the setting of
precedents.8 3
Importantly, some commentators focus on this third effect con-
cerned that since "precedent is path-dependent, interest groups can
manipulate the substance of a body of case law by choosing to bring
and not to settle cases with favorable facts, and by engineering settle-
ments in unfavorable cases."' 84 While the private benefits that parties
may gain from settlement should be respected, settlement detracts
from the public benefit of precedent, so one may question whether
legal rules favoring settlement should be encouraged. 85 However, it
may be concluded that "despite the high percentage of settlements,
and the fact that economic models predict such a high settlement per-
75. Lederman, supra note 68, at 259.
76. See George Bittlingmayer and Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust Action
Against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry?, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (2000).
77. See POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 33.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
81. See POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 33.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Lederman, supra note 68, at 268.
85. Id. at 257.
2003]
430 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
centage even without third-party intervention, legal rules favor
settlement."8 6
4. Conclusion Regarding Utility of Settlement
One may certainly question whether the law should encourage set-
tlement, rather than neutrally respecting the contractual freedom of
litigants.8 7 Nonetheless, given the extent of economic literature sup-
porting settlements, as well as the support that many courts and com-
mentators express for the settlement of lawsuits,88 it is difficult to
attack those circuits following the Maryland Casualty approach for
their support of settlements. Moreover, "[flederal policy seems to
favor settlement and disfavor litigation, as reflected in the Civil Justice
Reform Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 408's exclusion from evidence of settlements and settlement of-
fers, and statutory support for private contractual agreements to
arbitrate rather than litigate. '89 One cannot criticize the circuits fol-
lowing Maryland Casualty for executing federal policy. The merits of
that policy may more appropriately be the subject of future legislative
debate.
B. The Appropriate Rule?
The troublesome question is whether the Maryland Casualty rule
actually fulfills its goal of encouraging and enforcing settlement. To
determine this, one needs to examine the effect the rule has on both
plaintiff-creditors and defendant-debtors.
1. Effect of the Maryland Casualty Rule on Parties
The phenomena of risk-aversion, asymmetrical information, and
moral hazard shape the incentives of both the plaintiff-creditor and
defendant-debtor.
a. Risk Aversion
Empirically, most individuals are risk averse, meaning that an indi-
vidual prefers to bear a given cost with certainty rather than an uncer-
tain prospect of a greater cost that has the same expected value. 90
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1994).
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § § 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992).
90. EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 451 (4th ed. 1992).
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Ceteris paribus,9' a risk-averse defendant will be prone to settle, "pre-
ferring the certainty of a settlement to a gamble on the outcome of a
trial, even if the expected cost of going to trial is somewhat lower than
the cost of the settlement. ' 92 If the risk of a trial outcome were for-
ever eliminated through the formulation of a novation with the plain-
tiff, this would encourage risk-averse defendants to settle. However,
although a settlement agreement typically involves the release or
waiver of the underlying fraud claim,93 courts following the Maryland
Casualty rule claim that any plaintiff who does not wish to risk dis-
charge of a tort claim in bankruptcy can simply avoid including an
express discharge of tort liability in a settlement agreement. 94 With-
out such a release, a defendant's settlement incentive is greatly dimin-
ished, as the plaintiff retains the ability to resurrect the fraud claim,
again leaving the defendant-debtor exposed to a risky trial outcome.
Unless a plaintiff-creditor is willing to include an express discharge of
liability in the novation (and hence accept the risk of a bankruptcy
filing by a defendant-debtor), the goal of encouraging and enforcing
settlements is hampered (since defendants would be denied a substan-
tial benefit of a settlement agreement).
While the Maryland Casualty rule may actually discourage defend-
ants from settling, the effect on risk-averse plaintiffs is unclear.
Again, given the assumption that a plaintiff is able to accurately and
costlessly assess risk and does not suffer from any cognitive bias, a
risk-averse plaintiff, like a risk-averse defendant, prefers the certainty
of settlement to a risky trial outcome, even where the expected value
of the trial outcome is somewhat higher (lower in the case of the de-
fendant) than that of the settlement.
The risks that such a plaintiff-creditor faces are two-fold under the
Maryland Casualty rule. On the one hand, the novation in and of it-
self will reduce the risk of losing a lawsuit and, thus, should have the
effect of inducing a risk-averse plaintiff to enter into a settlement
agreement. On the other hand, the Maryland Casualty rule will in-
crease the risk that a formerly non-dischargeable tort claim will now
be discharged at some point in the future. Given the unknown magni-
tude of each of these countervailing risks, it is difficult to determine
91. Other things being equal. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (7th ed. 1999). An assump-
tion that both parties have perfect information and that there are no transaction costs.
92. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 530 (1991).
93. United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also In re Pavelka, 79
B.R. 228, 232 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("a party would be foolish not to include a release in a
stipulated settlement of a state court action").
94. See supra, note 28.
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their effect on a risk-averse plaintiff. Assuming no transaction costs
(as well as perfect information), where the riskiness of an uncertain
trial outcome dwarfs that of a defendant-debtor's bankruptcy risk, a
risk-averse plaintiff-creditor will be more likely to enter into a settle-
ment. However, under these assumptions, where the bankruptcy risk
exceeds that of an uncertain trial outcome, a plaintiff-creditor will not
be inclined to settle.
b. Information Asymmetry
Wherever one party to an economic relationship has more perfect
information than the other, the situation is one of asymmetric infor-
mation.95 In the present context, even with the empirically implausi-
ble assumption of risk-neutral parties, a plaintiff-creditor and a
defendant-debtor do not possess symmetrical information about de-
fendant-debtor's bankruptcy risk. A defendant-debtor is in a far bet-
ter position than a plaintiff-creditor to assess his own default risk.
Unsophisticated plaintiff-creditors are incapable of obtaining the pri-
vate information needed to assess a defendant-debtor's likelihood of
default. Even if this information could be obtained, the costs of such
an assessment could be prohibitive.
To further exacerbate this problem, a creditor cannot assess a
debtor's probability of bankruptcy solely by increasing its information,
as a debtor typically controls the decision of whether and when to file
for protection under the Bankruptcy Code,96 as well as whether to
incur debt to the point of insolvency (as discussed in the next section
of this Article regarding "moral hazard"). 97
c. Moral Hazard
Arising from the difficulty of asymmetric information is the prob-
lem of hidden actions whereby the informed side may take the
"wrong" action (that is, not do enough to prevent the action), also
known as "moral hazard. '98 Moral hazard is a phenomenon whereby,
95. See KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 69, at 595.
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2002). Of course, under certain circumstances, a debtor's creditors
may elect to file an involuntary bankruptcy protection against a debtor, and the debtor retains
the right to contest such a petition on certain grounds. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2002).
97. Insolvency is not a requirement of an individual's bankruptcy filing. 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUI'rCY $ 301.04[1], at 301-06 (15th ed. rev. 2002) ("While debtors frequently are insolvent,
insolvency itself, as defined in section 101 of the Code, is not a requirement for protection under
chapters 7, 11, 12, or 13 of the Code."). However, where a debtor is not insolvent (and assuming
insolvency is not caused by the expenses of bankruptcy administration), debt claims may, in any
event, be paid in full, rendering a discharge worthless to a debtor.
98. KATZ & Rosen, supra note 69, at 621.
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for example, as a result of having insurance, an individual's behavior
changes in such a way that the probability of the unfavorable outcome
increases or its cost is greater upon occurrence. 99 This may apply in
the present context, since a defendant-debtor may be more likely to
engage in risky behavior if the debtor knows the debt is dischargeable
in bankruptcy; "[I]t is generally recognized that firms and individuals
on the edge of insolvency have an incentive to behave in a risk-prefer-
ring100 fashion, since they capture the upside gains of a gamble while
being protected from the downside losses by limited liability." 10'
2. Effect of the Greenberg Rule on the Parties
Acknowledging the aforementioned phenomena seems to suggest
that the Greenberg approach is more appropriate than the Maryland
Casualty approach. Given that, under the Greenberg approach, courts
look at the nature of the underlying tort claim and may decline to
discharge the novation, risk-averse plaintiffs who face default risk that
exceeds the risk of an uncertain trial outcome will be more inclined to
settle (since they will no longer face the risk of default). Since plain-
tiffs will be free to release a defendant from liability without fearing
the loss of the benefit-of-the-bargain if the debtor files for bankruptcy
protection, a risk-averse defendant-debtor will be able to receive the
benefit of eliminating trial uncertainty. The problem of information
asymmetry is then eliminated because the plaintiff need not assess the
defendant's risk of default. Finally, because the novated debt will not
be discharged upon bankruptcy, the defendant will not behave in a
fashion that is more likely to increase his bankruptcy risk. However,
the Greenberg approach may not be favorable in all instances.
3. Are All Parties Created Equal?
There are at least two other types of plaintiffs that may be undeter-
red from entering into settlement arrangements. One class would be
risk-preferring plaintiffs seeking to enter settlement arrangements be-
cause they enjoy the risk of a debtor's default.'02
99. See BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 90, at 453.
100. A risk preferring individual is one who prefers an uncertain prospect with a particular
expected value to a certainty with the same expected value. See KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 69,
at 186.
101. Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in
Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1300 (1996).
102. While this is theoretically plausible, it is not empirically supported. See KATZ & ROSEN,
supra note 69, at 189-90.
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a. Plaintiffs with Superior Ability to Assess Risk
(Reduction of Information Asymmetries)
The second type of plaintiff that may not be deterred from creating
a settlement arrangement expressly releasing a debtor from tort liabil-
ity would be one that could: (a) easily assess the likelihood of a
debtor's default; (b) accurately price that risk of default into the nova-
tion; and (c) accept the risk because of a superior capacity of risk di-
versification. For example, a plaintiff-creditor may be able to
determine a defendant-debtor's need for access to credit, or the value
that the debtor attributes to her reputation, as potential constraints
inhibiting a defendant's filing for bankruptcy protection. Perhaps cer-
tain governmental, corporate, and financial entities would qualify as
such a plaintiff-creditor.
b. Entities that are Less Risk-Averse
Some analysts claim that in addition to the superior ability to price
risk, entities such as corporations are less risk-averse than individuals
because they have a greater ability to diversify their risk portfolios. 10 3
In reality, however, a firm's diversification capabilities do not make it
less risk-averse than an individual - simply more capable of minimiz-
ing risk.10 4 Despite the diversification capacity of these entities, they
may, at best, behave as if they are risk-neutral.
c. Effect on These Plaintiffs
Assuming that these hypothetical plaintiff-creditors accurately price
into the novation the risk of a debtor's default, and choose to accept
this risk because of their superior capacity to diversify the risk, courts
following the Greenberg approach would potentially overcompensate
this plaintiff-creditor in the event of a defendant-debtor's default. In
order to avoid such a result, each section 523(a)(2)(A) novation in-
quiry would then require a bankruptcy court to assess whether default
risk was priced into the novation. This could entail an inquiry into the
sophistication of the plaintiff, and an examination both of the provi-
sions of the settlement agreement and, potentially, parole evidence.
Despite the sophistication of bankruptcy courts, this introduces, in ad-
dition to expenditure of additional resources, the possibility of error.
Given that neither the Maryland Casualty approach nor the Green-
berg approach entirely addresses the problems surrounding the dis-
103. See Alexander, supra note 92, at 531.
104. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 482
(1992).
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charge of novated fraud debt, other alternatives should be examined,
aimed at better accomplishing the desired goals of the circuit courts
supporting each of the presently existing solutions.
IV. Ipso FACTO CLAUSES As A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Ipso facto clauses are also commonly referred to as "bankruptcy
clauses" or "default upon filing clauses."' 0 5 They typically provide
that a loan or contract is either terminated or automatically acceler-
ated upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, or that a bankruptcy
filing constitutes an event of default, entitling a lender or contract-
holder to terminate or accelerate the terms of the contract or lease. 10 6
Ipso facto clauses are similar to "financial covenant" or "restrictive
covenant" clauses in contracts and loan agreements, designed to deter
a debtor from unilaterally engaging in certain behavior, such as modi-
fying investment behavior to include riskier choices, that increases the
risk to the other party to the loan or contract10 7 These covenants are
designed so that the creditor can police this misbehavior by allowing it
to "call" the loan upon the occurance of opportunistic behavior. 10 8
The ipso facto clause, which terminates a loan or contract upon a
debtor's bankruptcy filing, plays an analogous role. 10 9 It serves as a
sweeping in terrorem" ° clause designed to deter certain misbehavior,
imposing a cost on a debtor who resorts to bankruptcy - therefore
making activities that increase the likelihood of bankruptcy more
costly."' Unlike financial covenants, which narrowly define measures
of increased risk, the ipso facto clause uses a bankruptcy filing as a
rough proxy for evidence of increased risk." 2
A. Ipso Facto Clauses in the Section 523(a)(2)(A) Context
In the context of the Bankruptcy Code's dischargeability provisions,
the parties may choose to construct a settlement agreement that al-
lows the novation, upon bankruptcy, to revert to a non-dischargeable
105. Aaron C. von Staats, Note, Ipso Facto Clauses and Chapter 7 Bankruptcies: Superfluous
Contract Provisions, Enforceable Prenuptials, or Contrary to the Fresh Start?, 32 B.C. L. REV.
703, 704 (1991).
106. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 887 (1982).
107. Id. at 888. See supra Part III.B.1.c of this Article (regarding moral hazard).
108. Jackson, supra note 106, at 888.
109. Id. at 889.
110. "A provision designed to threaten one into action or inaction; esp., a testamentary provi-
sion that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who challenges the terms of the will." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 825 (7th ed. 1999).
111. See Jackson, supra note 106, at 889.
112. Id.
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intentional tort action for fraud, with liquidated damages remaining
for the amount unpaid under the promissory note. 113 Upon filing for
bankruptcy protection, a debtor may be prevented from discharging
this liquidated amount.
Again, plaintiffs may choose not to accept the risk of bankruptcy for
several reasons. The plaintiff may be risk-averse, and therefore would
assign too much weight to events that have low probability of occur-
rence (where the consequences of such events are extremely ad-
verse). 114 On the other hand, the plaintiff may experience difficulty,
at a reasonable cost, in accurately assessing the defendant's default
risk. Finally, a plaintiff may be incapable of diversifying the risk of
default. Thus, in those situations where the plaintiff chooses not to
accept the risk of the defendant's insolvency, the novation could con-
tain an ipso facto clause. Under the ipso facto clause regime, the as-
sumption would be that, absent an ipso facto clause, the parties have
priced the risk of default into their settlement. Therefore, pursuant to
Maryland Casualty, the debt would be rendered dischargeable.
In this fashion, since ipso facto clauses reveal the defendant's pri-
vate information to the plaintiff, they might provide a means of elimi-
nating information asymmetries. This may, in turn, encourage parties
to settle. A tort-feasor may offer a plaintiff the benefit of an ipso
facto clause where the ex ante gain from this barter exceeds the gain
from strategically filing for bankruptcy protection, thus revealing a
credible commitment to the settlement.11 5 Since the plaintiff does not
charge a risk premium, and the defendant is denied the private benefit
of discharging the debt if upon bankruptcy, the defendant has a
greater incentive to avoid strategic behavior where an enforceable
ipso facto clause exists.1 16 The clause functions as a commitment de-
vice that the debtor can use to credibly signal the creditor that she will
behave appropriately.1 17
This approach may resolve the concerns of both the Maryland Cas-
ualty adherents, as well as the Greenberg followers. Creditors who
accept the risk of default will receive no more than the benefit of their
bargain in the event of a default. Those creditors who do not accept
113. See discussion infra Part IV regarding the enforceability of stipulations as to the nondis-
chargeability of debt. Importantly, any contract providing for resurrection of a tort claim should
include a provision tolling the applicable statute of limitations.
114. See Alexander, supra note 92, at 531.
115. Cf Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and
Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 445 (1999).
116. Id at 448.
117. Id.; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW 224 (1979) (discussing the signaling function of penalty clauses).
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the risk of default have a device that they can use to settle claims
without being adversely affected by an erroneous discharge. Defend-
ants remain encouraged to settle, as the tort claims against them are
waived in the absence of bankruptcy, and, furthermore, defendants'
strategic bankruptcies are deterred.
B. Obstacles to an Ipso Facto Clause Solution
There are at least two identifiable obstacles to successfully employ-
ing an ipso facto clause strategy in the context of the Bankruptcy
Code's dischargeability provisions. Most importantly, the Bankruptcy
Code generally prohibits the enforcement of ipso facto clauses. 118
Moreover, even where they are permitted, courts selectively enforce
them.119
1. Enforceability of Ipso Facto Clauses Under Section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code
Prior to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, parties to contracts and
leases could use ipso facto clauses to opt out of related bankruptcy
statutory provisions.1 20 Section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
promulgated in 1978,121 however, generally t 22 renders ipso facto
118. Sections "365(e)(1), 541(c)(1) and 545(1), deal respectively with executory contracts and
leases, property of the estate and statutory liens, and limit the enforcement of ipso facto clauses
in bankruptcy." Jerry M. Markowitz, Contracting To Avoid Assumption: A Review of the Availa-
bility of Certain Contractual Provisions That May Be Employed to Assist Landlords in Asserting
and Enforcing Bargained-For Rights, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 155, 168 n.5 (2002).
119. Thomas J. Cunningham, Postpetition Payments on Secured Debt: Ipso Facto Clauses and
Their Relationship to Reaffirmation Agreements, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 213, 229 (1992).
120. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 365.05[4], at 365-52 (15th ed. rev. 2002).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1978). COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY explains § 365(e), stating:
Section 365(e) expressly invalidates ipso facto and other bankruptcy termination
clauses that might otherwise prevent the estate from receiving the benefit of an execu-
tory contract or lease. Under § 365(e), a clause providing for the termination or modifi-
cation of an executory contract or lease conditioned on the debtor's insolvency or
financial condition, the commencement of a bankruptcy case, or the appointment of a
receiver or custodian, is inoperative in a bankruptcy case. Section 365(e) has also been
held to preempt contrary provisions of state law which purport to release the non-
debtor from a contract upon bankruptcy filing. Consequently, the trustee or debtor-in-
possession may assume such a contract or lease notwithstanding a clause triggered by
these events.
The broad language of § 365(e) is intended to address provisions in contracts or leases
that lead to the same effect as a clause triggered by bankruptcy, without mentioning
bankruptcy. Thus, a provision conditioned on the debtor's insolvency or financial con-
dition, or on the appointment of a trustee or receiver, is invalid because it is most likely
to operate in the vicinity of a bankruptcy case.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 91 365.07, at 565-67 (15th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
122. Subject to certain limited exceptions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2).
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clauses contained in executory contracts and unexpired leases unen-
forceable.' 23 According to section 365(e)(1):
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or
unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified,
and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be
terminated or modified at any time after the commencement of the
case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is
conditioned on:
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any
time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a
case under this title or a custodian before such
commencement. 124
As a corollary to section 365(e)(1), section 365(b)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits a debtor to "assume" (in essence, ratify) an exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease in bankruptcy without curing
defaults related to ipso facto clauses. 25
123. See Che & Schwartz, supra note 115, at 442. See also Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc. (In re
Auto Int'l Refrigeration), 275 B.R. 789, 811 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) ("whether the lender or the
debtor is using 365(e)(1) as a defense, the Code clearly states that ipso facto clauses are unen-
forceable and thus can not be considered as an event of default"); In re Metrobility Optical Sys.,
Inc., 268 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2001) ("Section 365(e) invalidates ipso facto clauses in
executory contracts and unexpired leases."); In re Nat'l Hydro-Vac Indus. Servs., L.L.C., 262
B.R. 781, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001) ("That section [365(e)(1)] 'expressly invalidates ipso facto
and other bankruptcy termination clauses' predicated on the financial condition of the debtor,
the debtor's bankruptcy filing or the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy."); In re Pak, 252
B.R. 215, 217 n.l (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) ("A creditor cannot force a default upon a debtor by
the use of the ipso facto clause of a contract solely because of a bankruptcy filing."); Lyons Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, Inc., 828 F.2d 387, 393 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Section
365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code invalidates ipso facto or bankruptcy termination clauses which
permit one contracting party to terminate or even modify an executory contract or unexpired
lease in the event of the bankruptcy of the other contracting party."); In re Monica Scott, Inc.,
123 B.R. 990, 992 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) ("Insolvency and bankruptcy clauses typically
define default to include insolvency or the filing for bankruptcy protection. The clauses are not
enforceable in bankruptcy."); In re Texaco Inc., 73 B.R. 960, 965 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("A
termination or modification clause in a contract which is triggered by the filing of a bankruptcy
case is expressly denounced and is unenforceable .....
124. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1).
125. In relevant part section 365(b) provides:
(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract of such contract or lease, the trustee -
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such
default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any
actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default;
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a. The Definition of Executory Contract 126
Contracts are generally considered executory where they are par-
tially performed.127 While the Bankruptcy Code contains no express
definition of an executory contract, the legislative history of section
365(a) indicates that Congress's intent was for the term to mean a
contract "on which performance [is] due to some extent on both
sides."128 The Black's Law Dictionary definition of an executory con-
tract in the bankruptcy context is a contract "under which the debtor
and non-debtor each have unperformed obligations and the debtor, if
it ceased further performance, would have no right to the other
party's continued performance."' 129 That is, the obligations of both
the debtor and non-bankrupt party to the contract are as yet unper-
formed and that failure of either party to perform would cause a ma-
terial breach. 130
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or
lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a
provision relating to -
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the clos-
ing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy Code];
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under [the
Bankruptcy Code] or a custodian before such commencement; or
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a default arising
from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations under the
executory contract or unexpired lease ....
11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
126. Generally, the definition of executory- contract employed and adopted by most courts
(i.e., material performance required by both sides) was engendered by scholar Vern
Countryman. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 200 (3d ed. rev. 2001).
127. Che & Schwartz provide the example:
[I]f the contract required a seller to deliver goods to the firm and the seller had deliv-
ered them before insolvency, the contract is not executory: the seller fully performed
her obligation, thereby maturing the buyer's duty to pay. If instead the contract re-
quired the seller to deliver goods and the firm became insolvent before the seller deliv-
ered or was paid, the contract is executory: the seller has still to perform and the
buyer's obligation is contingent on performance.
Che & Schwartz, supra note 115, at 441-42.
128. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303; see S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 58 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844.
129. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (7th ed. 1999).
130. See Sable v. Morgan Sangamon P'ship, 280 B.R. 217, 220 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Southmark Corp. (In re
Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("[A] contract
is executory if the obligations of both parties are so unperformed that the failure of either party
to complete performance would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of
the other,") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d
297, 308 n.19 (5th Cir. 1997) ("'[A]n executory contract "is one that is still unperformed by both
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Significantly, several courts suggest that where the debtor's only re-
maining performance is the payment of money, there can be no execu-
tory contract (even where the other side's performance is not yet
completed). 13' This reasoning originates from the courts' reliance on
a legislative history comment that an obligation on a note is not usu-
ally an executory contract. 132 However, certain commentators
disagree:
[T]his reliance seems misplaced, as the statement was not of a gen-
eral proposition. Close examination of the statement reveals an as-
sumption that the obligee on the note had no duties left to perform.
Thus the statement's disqualification of the note as an executory
contract may have had nothing to do with the remaining one-sided
obligation being to pay money and everything to do with the re-
maining obligation being one-sided. 133
b. The Economics of Enforcement
The Congressional intent behind section 365(e)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code was to protect debtors from the enforcement of unfavor-
able insolvency-triggered termination clauses in executory contracts
and unexpired leases. 34 The invalidation of such clauses for section
365 purposes attempts to promote the goal of rehabilitating a debtor
by enabling assumption (and hence, continuation of) beneficial con-
tracts that would otherwise have terminated. 135 Bankruptcy courts
additionally credit the desire to enhance a debtor's bankruptcy estate
as a justification for the non-enforcement of ipso facto clauses. 136
However, recent economic analysis has cast doubt that restricting the
enforcement of ipso facto clauses effectively accomplishes either of
these goals. 37
Nevertheless, at least one market-based reason exists for not en-
forcing ipso facto clauses: they may generate externalities. 38 Imagine
the hypothetical creditor possessing a contract containing an ipso
facto clause, entitling the creditor to repossession of goods that the
debtor purchases in the event of bankruptcy. If the ipso facto clause is
parties or one with respect to which something still remains to be done on both sides"') (quoting
Lee v. Cherry, 812 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App. 1991), reh'g of writ overruled (Jan. 8, 1992)).
131. BAIRD, supra note 126, at 200.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See In re S. Pac. Funding Corp., 268 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348-49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6304-05
(noting that enforcement of ipso facto clauses "frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts")).
136. Che & Schwartz, supra note 115, at 462.
137. Id.
138. See Jackson, supra note 106, at 890.
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enforceable in bankruptcy, under certain circumstances an element of
moral hazard is introduced where the creditor may have an incentive
to promote the debtor's bankruptcy filing.' 39 This would occur be-
cause the creditor, by possessing the rights of an "ipso facto" clause, is
better off when the debtor goes into bankruptcy whenever the market
rate of the goods exceeds the contract price.' 40 Therefore, the credi-
tor has an incentive to force a debtor into bankruptcy, 141 even if this is
not in the debtor's other creditors' collective interest. 142 Alterna-
tively, a debtor may forego bankruptcy because of the effect of bank-
ruptcy on a single creditor relationship, even where bankruptcy would
benefit the debtor's creditor body as a whole.
Under these circumstances, the creditor possessing the ipso facto
clause could bargain with other creditors, but there would be high
transaction costs in negotiation since there might be multiple creditors
who possess dissimilar contractual entitlements. 143
One may argue for non-enforcement of ipso facto clauses because
they unfairly prioritize creditors who possess them. However, as with
a secured creditor, those who possess ipso facto clauses have already
"paid" for this entitlement, a higher probability of being repaid, by
receiving of a lower return than had they priced in default risk (at
least in theory). 144 Conversely, those creditors who do not possess
such clauses have already been "paid" for allowing this prior entitle-
ment since they receive a higher rate of return because of their lower
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. This issue may be weakened in this example in the section 523(a)(2)(A) context given the
contract is a novation where the underlying "good" is the tort claim whose market price is not
existent or at least not readily quantifiable. Moreover, the presence of transaction costs and
uncertainty in actually pursuing a legal remedy may deter holders of a novation from behaving
strategically. Furthermore, even in the goods contract context, an externality problem is not
inevitable. First, the costs introduced by the presence of the ipso facto clause may be "priced
out." The debtor could be affected directly by the costs the clause imposes on his other creditors
in the form of higher credit charges by them. Second, there are rules that regulate the creditor-
initiated implementation of the bankruptcy process, such as those that require that the debtor is
not paying debts as they become due, and those that require, under certain circumstances, initia-
tion by a minimum of three or more creditors with unsecured claims. See Jackson, supra note
106, at 891-92; discussion infra note 142.
142. Jackson, supra note 106, at 890. To the extent a creditor is able to either exert influence
over a debtor to compel bankruptcy, or to file an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under
section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, there may be remedies for improper action, whether under
non-bankruptcy law, or under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)
(2002). Perhaps a contract may contain restrictions on certain of the creditor's rights to propel
the debtor into bankruptcy.
143. Jackson, supra note 106, at 890-891.
144. Cf. id. at 871.
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priority position. 45  Besides, in the context of the section
523(a)(2)(A) fraud debate, the creditor who possesses a novation
would have been entitled to non-dischargeability had she not novated
the former tort claim.
Perhaps the strongest reason, however, for enforcing ipso facto
clauses in the section 523(a)(2)(A) context is that, by definition, a no-
vation is not generally executory. 46 Where the only remaining per-
formance in a contract is the debtor's payment (such as in an
installment sales contract), it is not executory and instead outside the
section 365 framework. 147
2. Enforceability of Ipso Facto Clauses Under Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code
Although section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is solely applicable to
unexpired leases and executory contracts, the enforceability of ipso
facto clauses must be examined in a broader context, on the ground
that these clauses may nevertheless be subject to bankruptcy court ap-
proval and review. 48 In relevant part, section 541(c)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest
of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate under sub-
section (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of this section notwithstanding any
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable
nonbankruptcy law:
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of
the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on
the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects
or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination
of the debtor's interest in property.' 49
Under section 541(c)(1), bankruptcy courts may potentially be
granted the discretion in bankruptcy cases to void ipso facto clauses-
even where the clause is contained in an agreement that is neither an
executory contract nor unexpired lease. 150 Indeed, this may very well
145. Id.
146. See Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Southmark
Corp. (In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
147. See Cunnigham, supra note 119, at 214 n.7.
148. William L. Medford & Bruce H. White, Ipso Facto Clauses and Reality: I Don't Care
What the Documents Provide, 21-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 51 (2002) (citing Farm Credit of
Cent. Fla. ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993), In re Randall Enters. Inc., 115
B.R. 292 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(l) (2002).
150. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Garcia (In re Garcia), 276 B.R. 627, 639 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002).
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have been the Bankruptcy Commission's intent in assembling the ini-
tial draft of the Bankruptcy Code, which "invalidated" ipso facto
clauses and restraints on alienation.' 51
Although certain courts have opined that the eventually-adopted
Bankruptcy Code voids ipso facto clauses altogether, there exists con-
trary authority to the effect that section 541(c)(1) only thwarts ipso
facto clauses to the limited extent necessary to permit property to
reach the debtor's bankruptcy estate.152 Generally courts that univer-
sally invalidate ipso facto clauses, argue that the clauses run contrary
to the bankruptcy law's policy of granting debtors a "fresh start."'
153
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, as
promulgated, indicates that sweeping invalidation of ipso facto clauses
in bankruptcy was not Congress's intention. 154 Congress was appar-
ently concerned with the inequity of validating ipso facto clauses in all
circumstances under the Bankruptcy Act (the Bankruptcy Code's
predecessor), as well as the arbitrariness which would be engendered
if bankruptcy courts were required to evaluate ipso facto clauses on a
piecemeal, equitable basis. As a result, in crafting section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress specifically forbade enforcement in bank-
ruptcy of ipso facto clauses contained in executory contracts and
unexpired leases, but implicitly left ipso facto provisions valid in other
151. Id. (citing Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States Pt. I1,
§ 4-601(b), at 147-48, H.Doc. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Invalidity of Certain Restric-
tions and Forfeitures. Any prohibition on the transfer of property by the debtor and any provi-
sion for forfeiture or termination conditioned on the filing of a petition are unenforceable as to
property of the estate ....").
152. Id. at 639-40. Compare Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Perry (In re Perry), 729
F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding ipso facto clauses unenforceable as a matter of law), and
First & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Ballance (In re Ballance), 33 BR. 89, 91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)
(finding ipso facto clauses invalid under all circumstances) (citing In re N. Am. Dealer Group,
Inc., 16 B.R. 996 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)), and Brock v. Am. Sec. Bank (In re Brock), 23 B.R.
998 (Bankr. D.C. 1982)), with Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053,
1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that ipso fact clauses are to be initially held inoperative under
section 541(c)(1), but that once the property was abandoned by the trustee, the section 541(c)
prohibition was inoperative, and the ipso facto was once again effective) (citing In re Schweitzer,
19 B.R. 860, 865 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
153. See Cunnigham, supra note 119, at 219.
154. Cunnigham cites as evidence:
The Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ...
recommended rendering ipso facto clauses 'unenforceable as to property of the estate.'
... The drafters apparently took this advice: 'Section 365(e) does not limit the applica-
tion of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause to a new insolvency or receivership after the
bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely made
inapplicable during the case for the purposes of disposition of the executory contract or
unexpired lease.' (citations omitted).
See Cunnigham, supra note 119, at 217 n.25.
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contexts.' 55 While this solution resolved some of the inequities of the
Bankruptcy Act, courts continued to decide the propriety of ipso facto
clause enforcement outside of the section 365 environment. 56
3. Ipso-Facto Clauses in Other Contexts
There has been significant debate and indecision regarding the en-
forceability of ipso facto clauses in other specific bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy contexts. As a result of the existence of section 365's ex-
plicit provisions regarding the irrelevance of ipso facto clauses, these
other contexts may be most useful in our analysis.
For example, courts have reached varying conclusions regarding the
enforceability of pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay of (among
other things) debt collection that the debtor's bankruptcy filing im-
poses, under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 157 upon a debtor's
creditors. Certain courts enforce these waivers against debtors, 158
many courts consider the waivers as factors in determining whether
relief should be granted, 59 and some courts categorically refuse en-
forcement. 160 The courts ground their decisions on a variety of justifi-
cations. The policies of holding debtors to their contracts' 61 and
encouraging out-of-court restructuring 62 buttress the argument in
favor of enforceability. In contrast, courts cite, among other things,
protection of other creditors 63 and deprivation of a debtor's opportu-
nity to reorganize 164 as reasons to deny enforcement of pre-petition
waivers of the automatic stay.
Although provisions accelerating the maturity of debt upon a bank-
ruptcy filing are generally enforceable, 165 similar debate exists in and
155. Id. at 229.
156. Id.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2002).
158. See, e.g., In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994).
159. See, e.g., In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
160. See, e.g., In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
161. See In re Gulf Beach Dev. Corp., 48 B.R. 40, 43 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
162. See In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. at 819.
163. See In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
164. See In re Jenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 181 B.R. 33, 36-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
165. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Schweitzer (In re Schweitzer), 19 B.R. 860, 867-68
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[T]he contract provision which accelerated the debt upon the filing of
the petition in reality did no more, at least in regard to the outstanding principal, than what the
Code does automatically. In other words, inasmuch as 'bankruptcy operates as the acceleration
of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor,' . . . one can hardly brand the clause as
against public policy.") (citation omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B) (1978) (Section
365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code "does not apply to an executory contract .... if ... such
contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommoda-
tions, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor."). Of course, even
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out of bankruptcy. These areas of debate include the enforceability of
pre-petition waivers of the discharge which would otherwise be ob-
tainable in bankruptcy, 166 stipulated findings that a bankruptcy filing
was made in bad faith, 167 and usury "savings" clauses (stipulations
preventing the amount of interest upon a loan from constituting a usu-
rious rate). 168
In these contexts, an important distinction must be made between
ipso facto clauses which include a defendant-debtor's agreement that
the debt in question will be excepted from the debtor's discharge upon
a bankruptcy filing, and ipso facto clauses which simply permit a credi-
tor-plaintiff's tort action to be automatically reinstated upon a bank-
ruptcy filing. While ipso facto clauses extending to findings of
nondischargeability (based upon an agreement as to the existence of
fraud) may be subject to all of the policy concerns discussed in the
contexts of, for example, automatic stay waivers, discharge waivers,
and bad faith findings, these concerns may be both alleviated where
the claim is simply resurrected and will be subject to adjudication, and
outweighed by the competing policy concerns in favor of enforcement
of the clauses.
4. Bankruptcy Courts Should Enforce Ipso Facto Clauses in the
Section 523(a)(2)(A) Context
Accepting the conclusion that ipso facto clauses may be enforced
outside the context of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, ipso facto
clauses embedded in novations should be favored on equitable
grounds. Since courts subscribing to Greenberg's reasoning attribute
weight to providing honest debtors with a "fresh start" in bank-
though the maturity of debt may be accelerated, it still remains uncollectable absent relief from
the automatic stay.
166. Compare Saler v. Saler (In re Saler), 205 B.R. 737, 743-48 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (hold-
ing that a bankruptcy court approved stipulation of nondischargeability in nondischargeability
litigation is enforceable in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding), affd, 217 B.R. 166 (E.D. Pa.
1998), with Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 651-54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding
pre-petition waiver of discharge void as against public policy).
167. Compare In re Aurora Invs., Inc., 134 B.R. 982, 986 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (pre-petition
stipulation of bad faith in filing bankruptcy petition held enforceable), with Colloquy, Good
Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 11, 39-40 (1993) (in which certain
sitting bankruptcy judges indicated their belief that pre-petition stipulations of bad faith are not
per se enforceable, but do provide evidence of bad faith).
168. Compare 5636 Alpha Rd. v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 879 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (N.D. Tex.
1995) (usury savings clause held enforceable because it negated intent required for usury), with
Swindell v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 409 S.E.2d 892, 896 (N.C. 1991) (usury savings clause held
invalid as against public policy).
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ruptcy, 169 these courts should uphold ipso facto clauses where enforce-
ment will prohibit a debtor from discharging debt incurred as a result
of the debtor's own dishonesty. In contrast, courts following the Ma-
ryland Casualty approach strongly support contractual freedom. 170 As
both the creditor and debtor have explicitly expressed their intentions
by fashioning the ipso facto clause included in the novation, these
courts should also favor their enforcement in bankruptcy.
V. CONCLUSION
While courts presently disagree on the dischargeability of novated
fraud debt under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
pragmatic resolution may exist.
The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits take the position that non-
dischargeable fraud debt may be transformed into dischargeable con-
tract debt upon the debt's novation. These courts reason that their
approach encourages and enforces settlements. To the contrary, the
District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits (as well as a Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel in the Sixth Circuit) disagree, arguing that discharg-
ing novated fraud debt encourages strategic bankruptcies by dishonest
debtors.
While the concerns that these courts raise are grounded in logic,
dogmatic attachment to either of the favored rules does not appear to
provide an adequate resolution. It is not at all clear that the Maryland
Casualty approach achieves its goal of encouraging settlements.
Moreover, the Greenberg approach may prove flawed where sophisti-
cated creditors are capable of assessing a debtor's default risk, and
pricing this risk into the novation.
However, despite some court's disinclination to enforce ipso facto
clauses in bankruptcy, encouraging ipso facto clauses may provide a
solution that better fulfills the courts' objectives. Where a novation
contains an ipso facto clause providing that the contract-based claim
reverts to a tort cause of action upon the tortfeasor's bankruptcy fil-
ing, that clause should be enforced in bankruptcy. Where the ipso
facto clause is more daring, and provides for a stipulated finding of
nondischargeability, the clause may still be enforceable, depending on
the bankruptcy court's evaluation of competing policy rationales. 171
Alternatively, where the novation explicitly provides that the debt
169. See Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 2002) (Traxler, J.,
dissenting).
170. See supra note 34.
171. In this circumstance, at the very least, the bankruptcy court should allow the claim to
revert to a tort-based cause of action.
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shall remain contract-based despite the bankruptcy, with no reinstate-
ment of the tort-based claim, the debt in question should be dis-
charged upon bankruptcy. Finally, where the contract lacks an ipso
facto clause, the intent of the parties is ambiguous and should remain
subject to the bankruptcy court's assessment and findings of fact.
Where sophisticated creditors have already priced into a novation a
debtor's default risk, this approach does not provide them with a
windfall. Less sophisticated creditors, or sophisticated creditors which
opt not to accept bankruptcy risk, will not be threatened by the pros-
pect of a debtor's default, and will therefore be encouraged to release
a debtor from tort claims. Finally, because strategic defaults are no
longer in their interest, debtors are armed with the means to signal
creditors of their credible commitment to abide by the novation's re-
payment terms.

